Troubles in the South – October 2006

Troubles in the South - October 2006
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(Photo: Dr. Has for 2Bangkok.com)

End of Ramadan - October 24, 2006
Dr. Has reports: Yala Province - October 24 is the end day after 30 days of fasting so today it has an important activity is Hariraya Adilftri Lamad at the mosque. After this they will ask forgiveness from each other that they have done outside or in the mind. Then they go to visit cousins, relatives or parents in at their hometowns.

Monks injured by a bomb in the deep south - October 23, 2006

Krungtepturakit, October 23, 2006

Very cruel: The assailants bomb the team protecting monks near Jamroonnara, Amphur Muang, Narathiwat. This causes 4 soldiers injured, 1 dead. 5 monks and 3 people got injured.



(Photo: Dr. Has for 2Bangkok.com)
Ramadan - October 19, 2006

Dr. Has reports: On today (October 19), almost all mosques organized a fast activity, because it is an important night at Ramadan (month of fasting). The government gave warm support--especially mosques in cities. 

"Audacious" - Krungtepturakit, October 18, 2006
The caption reads: Audacious: The officers investigate the damage to the car where an assailant shot a security guard in front of SME bank of Thailand in Yala branch, Amphur Muang, Yala. This causes 1 death, 2 injured in the car and also makes 2 nearby people injured.
Tracing potential routes to revolution through a thousand days of the southern insurgency - translated and summarized from Issara News Center, October 3, 2006
It has been over 33 months or 1,000 days since the event which could be considered as the first significant step in the current wave of insurgency in the deep south. That event was the insurgent robbery of armaments from an army depot on January 4, 2004.
This event cast doubt on the future of the deep south as an integral part of the Thai state. General Thammarak Issarangkul Na Ayudhaya, the Minister of Defense at that time, informed the public that it was an objective of the separatists to liberate Narathiwat Province within 1,000 days.
To achieve this objective, the separatists were reported to be implementing a tentative strategy that they had labeled the "Seven Step Operational Plan." This plan seems to have been originally devised in 1992.
The plan was subdivided into individual plans for "preparations" and "operations." In the "preparation" phase, the insurgents planned to rebuild their local organizations with greater strength, and recruit further manpower. They planned to do this by deceiving innocent local youngsters into joining them through indoctrination with religious ideology. The plan then involved local insurgent leaders instilling a military team ethic into their recruits with the aim of expanding their networks in areas targeted for attacks on the authorities.
In the operational phase, steps would be taken to stage the beginnings of a revolution with the young recruits being pressed into committing crimes and intimidating local communities. These steps would clearly demonstrate the capability of the separatists to attack the authorities at will. The local leadership would then resort to any available tactic to equip their network of recruits with enough weapons to embark on the final step of the liberation process.
We have seen a constant torrent of acts of insurgent violence during the past two years. It could be said that the operational phase has already reached the Sixth Step. The insurgents now have great potential strength and the authorities seem unable to cope with the situation when bomb attacks occur simultaneously at more than one location. And little can be done to prevent insurgent attacks. There has been no let-up in the level of the violence committed against the security forces. Innocent civilians are also equally at risk from arson and bomb attacks on public places and private property.
It is our great concern that there is a real possibility of the Seventh Step eventually occurring, in which an overwhelming revolution would be mounted to bring the conflict in the deep south into the global limelight thus allowing the intervention of international organizations. It is not too far-fetched to believe--from recent intelligence reports--that the insurgents have postponed the Seventh Step for about two years as they do not seem adequately organized to take the final step as originally planned for this year.
Somehow, it almost seems as if the recent coup d’etat has not brought about sufficient political change to ensure that the Seventh Step does not occur. There is, perhaps, an increasing possibility of the southern insurgency deepening still further. It is absolutely imperative that both the authorities and more moderate separatist factions are prepared to adopt very strong preventive strategies to stop an extremely violent revolution from taking place in the near future.

Mahathir’s son says he has discussed with 50 rebel leaders - translated and summarized from Matichon, October 11, 2006
Deputy Interior Minister Banyat Chansena said on October 10 that he has not discussed the revival of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center with Interior Minister. Mukhriz Mahathir, former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s son, reported that he had held a series of talks with more than fifty senior members of various separatist movements involved in Thailand’s southern unrest in a bid to understand what they wanted from the Thai government. He said it was not secession they wanted, but really more attention by the Thai government for the deep South--in particular economic development and education. The movements include the Bersatu and the Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Movement.

Two southern insurgents want Thailand to take Thaksin to the World Court - translated and summarized from Matichon, October 7, 2006
Recently an email was received by the press from two leading insurgents in the southern Thai separatist movement– Wan Kadae Jaeman (the leader of BERSATU) and Lukman B. Lima (the leader of the Pattani United Liberation Organisation - PULO). The two insurgents made it clear that they were interested in negotiating with General Sondhi Boonyaratglin, the Chairman of the Council for National Security (CNS).
One section of the email said that members of BERSATU had been trying to contact the Thai Government in an attempt to hold negotiations that might lead to peace in Thailand’s deep south. Lukman also called on the Thai Government to investigate former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who has been accused by some individuals of being “an enemy of mankind.” Lukman was of the opinion that Thaksin should be arraigned by the Netherlands-based International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague. He also added that the Thai government would never completely rid itself of its southern problem until Thaksin was forced to stand trial at the ICJ World Court.

Special Interview - Dr Mahathir Muhammad Former Prime Minister of Malaysia - TJA news, October 15, 2006
Mahathir’s son says he has discussed with 50 rebel leaders - translated and summarized from Matichon, October 11, 2006
Deputy Interior Minister Banyat Chansena said on October 10 that he has not discussed the revival of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center with Interior Minister. Mukhriz Mahathir, former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s son, reported that he had held a series of talks with more than fifty senior members of various separatist movements involved in Thailand’s southern unrest in a bid to understand what they wanted from the Thai government. He said it was not secession they wanted, but really more attention by the Thai government for the deep South--in particular economic development and education. The movements include the Bersatu and the Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Movement.

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